In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content::QOOK ·REVIP/WS 198 Nagel emerges from the pages of his book as a philosopher whom, even when we disagree with him, we can still admire. St.John's University Jamaica, New York ROBERT E. LAUDER Religious Experience. By WAYNE PROUDFOOT. Berkeley and.Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985. Pp. xix + 263. For the last two centuries, religious experience has been a central concern of those who have thought about religion. (...) When evidence about primitive religious beliefs and practices became widely available in the nineteenth century, it tended to be understood not so much as bearing on cosmology or history as expressing particular kinds of religious experience. This was seen as an advance on the Enlightenment, which used to treat pagan religions as mere complexes of erroneous belief and immoral conduct. It is notable, however, that, while religious experience itself appeared to be m~re or less universal, the idea of it was novel. However impressive Isaiah's or Paul's religious experience.may have been, they themselves would not have said that they underwent religious experience, or that they expressed it in their speech or writings. Ever since Schleiermacher, whose influence above all gained currency for the notion, its apologetical uses have been noted. Religion need no longer be justified, apparently, by metaphysical arguments, or by alleging its importance for the moral life; religion is autonomous, and all basic conflict with morality or science.is conveniently excluded. The present book is a sustained critique of ·this whole approach to religion. The author argues that there are no simple inner states directly available to introspection, as Schleiermacher and others seem to suppose; the inner states associated with religion depend ineluctably on concepts, beliefs, and practices. Many recent authors would agree with this stricture.as far as it goes, but still argue for the autonomy of religious language and doctrine, and renounce reductionism in the manner of Schleiermacher. But the author urges that, ingenious as is the resulting protective strategy, it is based upon a confusion. It is one thing to insist on neutrality in the description of religious phenomena-here the religious subject's viewpoint is all-important; but it is another to be neutral in explanation of them-here one has to transcend, and may well have to contradict, that viewpoint. As well as Schleiermacher's Speeches and Christian Faith, William James's Varieties of Religious Experience is subjected by the author to 194 BOOK REVIEWS detailed discussion. Successive chapters examine Schleiermacher's theory of religious experience, two conceptions of interpretation, the ascription of emotion to oneself and others, mysticism, religious experience as such, and different kinds of explanation of religious experience and the issue of reductionism. The book as a whole seems to me rather an impressive treatment of a very important subject. University of Calgary Calgary, Alberta HUGO A. MAYNELL Intimations of Reality: Critical Realism in Science and Religion. By ARTHUR PEACOCKE. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984. Pp. 94. $10.95(cl.), $4.95(pa.). In the first of the two lectures printed in this small volume, Peacocke argues for a " critical realist " interpretation of both scientific theories and religious doctrines. Both aim (fallibly but genuinely) to speak of reality, and their methods and tools are similar enough so that if the claims of one deserve to be taken seriously, so do those of the other. Addressing one reality as they do, science and theology cannot proceed in isolation, but must he regarded as "interacting and mutually illumiminating " (51). In the second lecture Peacocke offers suggestions as to how theologians should construe the relation between God and the created world, in view of what scientists are now telling us about the latter. Many of the ideas presented here are familiar from Peacocke's earlier Creation and the World of Science and from writings of Ian Barbour and others. The main novelty lies in his buttressing the case for (and refining the interpretation of) critical realism with arguments drawn from recent work in the philosophy of science. I will start with his discussion of critical realism with respect to science, and then consider his claims for theology, his argument for the mutual relevance... (shrink)

Hugo A Meynell; On the Aims of Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 10, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 79–97, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.

The idea that simplicity matters in science is as old as science itself, with the much cited example of Ockham's Razor, 'entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem': entities are not to be multiplied beyond necessity. A problem with Ockham's razor is that nearly everybody seems to accept it, but few are able to define its exact meaning and to make it operational in a non-arbitrary way. Using a multidisciplinary perspective including philosophers, mathematicians, econometricians and economists, this 2002 monograph examines simplicity (...) by asking six questions: what is meant by simplicity? How is simplicity measured? Is there an optimum trade-off between simplicity and goodness-of-fit? What is the relation between simplicity and empirical modelling? What is the relation between simplicity and prediction? What is the connection between simplicity and convenience? The book concludes with reflections on simplicity by Nobel Laureates in Economics. (shrink)

Magicians use misdirection to prevent you from realizing the methods used to create a magical effect, thereby allowing you to experience an apparently impossible event. Magicians have acquired much knowledge about misdirection, and have suggested several taxonomies of misdirection. These describe many of the fundamental principles in misdirection, focusing on how misdirection is achieved by magicians. In this article we review the strengths and weaknesses of past taxonomies, and argue that a more natural way of making sense of misdirection is (...) to focus on the perceptual and cognitive mechanisms involved. Our psychologically-based taxonomy has three basic categories, corresponding to the types of psychological mechanisms affected: perception, memory, and reasoning. Each of these categories is then divided into subcategories based on the mechanisms that control these effects. This new taxonomy can help organize magicians' knowledge of misdirection in a meaningful way, and facilitate the dialog between magicians and scientists. (shrink)